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Notes
THE STATUTORY PROPOSAL TO REGULATE
THE JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF
FOREIGN STATES
I. INTRODUCTION

In January 1973, the Departments of State and Justice submitted
to Congress a draft bill that defines the jurisdictional immunities of
foreign states in United States courts.' This draft legislation2 represents a major shift in the State Department's posture on the
substantive and procedural issues of sovereign immunity that will
undoubtedly stir considerable controversy within the international bar
during its examination by Congress. 3
A survey of current United States practice regarding the immunity
of foreign states reveals that reform is mandatory. At present the
determination whether a foreign state is entitled to jurisdictional
immunity is made by the courts, whose decisions admittedly are
governed by State Department "suggestions" transmitted through the

1. Department of State Release No. 321 (December 29, 1972).
2. S. 566, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 3493, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
1(1973). The bill, a Section-by-Section Analysis prepared by the drafters of the
bill, and the letter of transmittal to the President of the Senate are published in 12
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 118-62 (1973).
3. The proposed statute is not the first attempt by the State Department to
divest itself of its adjudicatory role in sovereign immunity cases. In 1969, the
Office of the Legal Adviser drafted the Belnan-Lowenfeld Proposal, which
apparently never left the confines of the State Department. The process of
changing foreign relations policy cannot be accomplished by State Department
fiat. It is difficult enough to obtain agreement within the Department of State,
but when the Departments of Justice, Defense, and Commerce must also endorse"
a proposal, the reasons for the failure of the Belman-Lowenfeld Proposal become
apparent. For a discussion of the problems of interdepartmental clearance in
changing foreign policy see the comments of Jack B. Tate, InternationalLaw in
Progress 70 (Proc. 1st Cornell Summer Conf. on Int'l L. 1957). The present
proposal, an outgrowth of the 1969 draft, is considerably more thorough and
complex. See Belman, New Departuresin the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 1969
PROc. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 182-87; Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign
States-A Proposalfor Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 901-03
(1969); Note, Statutory Reforms in Claims Against Foreign States: The
Belman-Lowenfeld Proposal,5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393 (1972).
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Attorney General. 4 The promise of the Tate letter,' which announced
the executive's withdrawal from the judicial process, has been
undermined repeatedly by executive suggestions of immunity prompted by political exigencies. Moreover, the political considerations
underlying these suggestions are not required to be disclosed and are
not subject to judicial review. Even when the executive branch is silent
in a particular case, the courts continue to defer to its dominant role
on sovereign immunity issues by referring to the policy set forth in the
Tate letter or to State Department "decisions" in past cases.
Additionally, the present state of the law provides neither the foreign
state nor the private claimant any assurance that a foreign state's
activity falls within the scope of the Tate letter doctrine. Further, the
variegated procedures for service of process and for attachment are
inadequate. Even if the court assumes jurisdiction, a final judgment
against the foreign sovereign may be worth nothing since the assets of
a foreign state are wholly immune from execution in satisfaction of a
judgment. Finally, the present arrangement is manifestly unfair to the
victims of a foreign state's torts.6 A more detailed examination of the
4. A State Department suggestion may take the form of an opinion, direction
or suggestion. A "suggestion" is generally defined to mean a communication from
the State Department to the Attorney General stating that a claim of immunity is
"recognized and allowed" by the Department. The Attorney General then
presents this communication to the court. A foreign state usually makes a request
for immunity by diplomatic note to the Department of State, but may request
immunity by the appearance in court of a diplomatic officer. In addition, the
State Department may initiate a suggestion or may reply to a request from the
court for guidance in a particular case. The procedural aspects of asserting a claim
of immunity are discussed in Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The PlaintiffDeserves
a Day in Court, 67 HARV. L. REV. 608, 612-13 (1954); Moore, The Role of the
State Department in Judicial Proceedings, 31 FoRlD. L. REV. 277, 279-84

(1962). These writers criticized the State Department practice of conducting ex
parte hearings without notice to the parties. State Department procedure now
permits written and oral argument prior to a determination, but such practice
seems unnecessary because the Department is basing its decision whether to grant
immunity on the status of the defendant and on foreign policy considerations; the
merits of plaintiff's claims are inconsequential at this stage. In theory, however,
the hearings do quiet procedural due process objections.
5. The "Tate letter" is the popular name given to a letter from Jack B. Tate,
Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State, to the Acting Attorney General,
Philip B. Perlman, announcing the Department's decision to follow the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity. The letter is published as Changed Policy
Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26
DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter cited as the Tate letter].

6. See Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 901-03.
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development and current practice of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is presented in Part II.
To resolve the above-described problems, the draft bill proposes a
comprehensive regime that would regulate all aspects of a private suit
against a foreign state, its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. First, and most significantly, the bill entirely removes the
State Department from the judicial process. The Department would
no longer issue suggestions at the request of a foreign sovereign or a
domestic court. In determining whether to grant immunity to a
foreign state, the courts would be guided solely by the statute,
existing and developing American and foreign case law, and principles
of international law. Secondly, the bill eliminates attachment as a
jurisdictional basis for claims against foreign states and implements
procedures for obtaining service of process by mail. Thirdly, the assets
of a foreign state relating to its commercial activities in the United
States will no longer enjoy absolute immunity from execution on
adverse judgments. The particulars of the proposed statute are
analyzed seriatim in Part III.
Notwithstanding the desiderata of a statutory regime governing
claims against foreign states, the fundamental question raised by this
particular proposal is whether it represents an unconstitutional
infringement of the executive's powers over the conduct of foreign
affairs. In its present form, the bill absolutely precludes executive
suggestions of immunity. Part IV of this Note considers whether the
executive has inherent powers in the area of foreign affairs, and, if so,
whether the power to suggest immunity to the courts is a necessary
incident of this power.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES

The doctrine of sovereign immunity was established in the United
States in the early nineteenth century7 and was subsequently adopted
by the community of nations as a rule of international law.' Broadly
stated, the doctrine stipulates that the courts of one state have no
jurisdiction over another sovereign state. Although several theories
have been advanced as the basis for sovereign immunity, it appears

7.

S. SUCHARITKUL,

STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES

(1959).
8. No attempt is made in this note to digest either American or foreign case
law, nor to examine foreign states' procedures in granting immunity. For a survey
of the position of various countries on the question of sovereign immunity see E.
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7

ALLEN,

THE
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that the doctrine evolved as an amalgam of the theories of sovereign
infallibility and independence, and principles of diplomatic immunity,
comity, and the equality and dignity of nations. 9 In applying the
doctrine, American courts consider several factors, including United
States foreign policy, executive "suggestions," the nature or purpose
of the foreign state's act and whether an adjudication on the merits
would embarrass the executive branch of government.
This Part provides both the background and the focal point for the
analysis of the proposed statute in Part III. The first subsection traces
the judicial development of the doctrine of jurisdictional immunity in
the United States and examines the role of the State Department in
the judicial process. The immunity problems encountered by an
American litigant in bringing a counterclaim, obtaining service of
process, attachment and execution on a favorable judgment are
discussed in separate subsections.
A.

JurisdictionalImmunity

The classic, or absolute, formulation of sovereign immunity was
first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange
v. McFaddon. o In that case a French warship, which had entered the
port of Philadelphia to make repairs, was libeled on the grounds that it

COURTS (1933); S. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 7; J. SWEENEY, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1963) (Policy Research
Study prepared for United States State Department); 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553-726 (1968); Garcfa-Mora, The Doctrine of

Sovereign Immunity of Foreign States and Its Recent Modifications, 42 VA. L.

REV. 335 (1956); Harvard Draft Convention on the Codification of International
Law, Part I1, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 451 (Supp. 1932) [hereinafter cited as Harvard
Draft Convention]; Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of

ForeignStates, 28

BRIT.

Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 250-72 (1952).

9. See 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § § 169-76
(1941); 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 841-44 (2d ed. 1970). But
see L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 115 (8th ed. Lauterpacht
1955): "The doctrine and practice of jurisdictional immunity of foreign States

and their agencies have been variously-and often simultaneously-deduced from
the principles of equality, of independence, and of dignity of State. It is doubtful
whether any of these considerations supply a satisfactory basis for the doctrine of
immunity. There is no obvious impairment of the rights of equality, or
independence, or dignity of a State if it is subjected to ordinary judicial processes
within the territory of a foreign state-in particular if that State, as appears to be
the tendency in countries under the rule of law, submits to the jurisdiction of its
own courts in respect of claims brought against it." (Footnotes ommitted.)
10. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
Spring, 1973

JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES

had been seized from its private American owners on the open seas by
the French Navy and then converted into a warship. Noting that in the
absence of precedent the Court was exploring "an unbeaten
path,"" the Chief Justice nonetheless clearly stated that the jurisdiction of the United States within its own territory was exclusive,
absolute and subject to no limitation by any external source without
the consent of the federal government. The Court explained, however,
that this "perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns,
and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and
an interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a
class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the
exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction
...

"12

Thus concepts of comity and equality of states, coupled with

the international custom of exempting visiting warships from the host
state's jurisdiction, 3 were found to be ample grounds for dismissing
the libel.' 4
The next significant United States decision on sovereign immunity
was handed down over one-hundred years later. In Berizzi Brothers
5
Co. v. S.S. Pesaro,"
a vessel owned by the Italian Government was
libeled in rem for breach of a contract to deliver goods. The Italian
Ambassador appeared before the district court and stated that the
vessel was owned, possessed and operated by and in the service of the
Italian Government and, therefore, was immune from jurisdiction of
United States courts. The parties agreed on the facts of ownership and
operation, but stipulated that the vessel was not connected with
military forces, but rather was employed in the carriage of goods
between Italian ports and ports of other countries in the interest of
the entire Italian nation, as distinguished from any individual or
group. The Department of State advised the Italian Ambassador that it
would not suggest immunity because the vessel was engaged in
commerce. The State Department's position was transmitted to the
Supreme Court, but the Attorney General disagreed with the new
policy and refused to convey the State Department's suggestion that

11. 11 U.S. at 136.
12. 11 U.S. at 136 (footnote omitted).
13. 11 U.S. at 145.
14. In The Exchange, the executive department filed a suggestion with the
court stating that regardless of whether the vessel had been unlawfully seized from
the American owners, the vessel was now under the control of the Emperor of
France and entitled to immunity. It is not clear from the opinion to what extent
the suggestion affected the decision to grant immunity.
15. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
Vol. 6-No. 2
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immunity be denied to the Court. 16 The Court granted immunity on
grounds that the ship was held by the Italian Government, served a
public purpose by advancing the economic welfare of the nation, and,
therefore, was as entitled to immunity as a vessel of war. 17 The
significance of the Pesaro case is twofold: First, it marks the only
instance during the development of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in which the Supreme Court has refused to follow a State
Department suggestion. Secondly, it perpetuated the absolute theory

16. During this period, the United States Government owned the United
States Merchant Navy. The State Department had instructed embassies abroad to
inform the governments to which they were accredited that the United States
would no longer claim immunity for government-owned vessels engaged in
commercial activity. 2 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 9, at 429-30, 439-46. This
posture created the climate for the Department's decision to require equal
treatment for foreign state-owned vessels conducting commercial activities in the
United States. The Attorney General disagreed with this policy because it
subjected his office to increased litigation responsibilities abroad. The refusal to
suggest immunity to the court was an attempt to preserve the absolute theory so
that the Justice Department could plead immunity in foreign courts on a basis of
reciprocity, notwithstanding the State Department's announced policy. Fensterwald, United States Policies Toward State Trading, 24 L. CONTEMP. PROB. 369,
387-93 (1959). The drafting of the proposed legislation discussed herein signifies,
perhaps, an even greater shift in attitude for the Department of Justice than for

the Department of State. For example, during the ten years between 1948 and
1958, the State Department negotiated some fourteen treaties containing
provisions obligating each contracting party to waive immunity for state-controlled enterprises engaged in business activities within the territories of the other.
The inclusion of such provisions was discontinued in 1958 at the insistence of the
Department of Justice, which claimed that this practice made defenses of
immunity untenable in foreign courts where the United States was the defendant.
Setser, The Immunity Waiver for State-Controlled Business Enterprisesin United
States Commercial Treaties, 1961 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 89; Timberg,
ExpropriationMeasures and State Trading, 1961 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
113, 114-15.
17. The Court noted that at the time The Exchange was decided no
government operated merchant vessels and that this fact explained why the Court
did not then examine this point. After quoting extensively from The Exchange,
the Court concluded that the earlier decision "cannot be taken as excluding
merchant ships held and used by a government from the principles there
announced. On the contrary, if such ships come within those principles, they must
be held to have the same immunity as war ships, in the absence of a treaty or
statute of the United States evincing a different purpose....
"We think the principles are applicable to all ships held and used by a
government for a public purpose, and that when, for the purpose of advancing the
trade of its people or providing revenue for its treasury, a government acquires,
Spring, 1973
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of sovereign immunity in the United States at a time when most of
our trading partners were adopting the restrictive theory of immunity.18

The Supreme Court again encountered the question of immunity of
a state-owned commercial vessel in Ex parte Republic of Peru. 9 The
Peruvian vessel had been libeled in rem for breach of a contract to
carry sugar. The Republic of Peru communicated with the State
Department and requested immunity. Although the Department of
Justice, at the request of the State Department, filed a suggestion of
immunity with the district court, Peru's claim of immunity was
dismissed on the ground that immunity had been waived by a general
appearance." ° The Supreme Court reversed and held that "the judicial
seizure of the vessel of a friendly foreign state is so serious a challenge
to its dignity, and may so affect our friendly relations with it, that
courts are required to accept and follow the executive determination
that the vessel is immune."2 1 The Department of State's suggestion,
which the Court had completely disregarded only a few years earlier,
had now become the controlling element. While the executive
suggestion in Peru conformed to the Court's holding in Pesaro, the
Court announced in Peru its willingness to adhere to determinations
by the executive branch and based its decision on this ground rather
than on the Pesaro case.
mans and operates ships in the carrying trade, they are public ships in the same
sense that war ships are." Berrizzi Bros. Co. v. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926).
Note, however, District Attorney Dallas' suggestion in The Exchange that if a
foreign sovereign were to "descend from the throne and become a merchant...
contract private debts... charter a vessel" he would submit to the law of the host
country and lose the immunity of sovereignty. The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 123 (1812).
18. See, e.g., International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels (Brussels Convention), April 10,
1926, 176 U.N.T.S. 199 (the United States is not a party to this multinational
agreement to subject state-owned commercial vessels to the same jurisdictional
standards as private vessels).
19. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
20. The Ucayali, 47 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. La. 1942). The district court held that
Peru, by taking the testimony of the ship's master for use at trial and by motions
for extension of time for filing defenses to the libel, had acted inconsistent with a
special appearance to contest the court's jurisdiction.
21. 381 U.S. at 588. Moreover, the Court found that the State Department's
determination of immunity "must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive
determination by the political arm of the Government that the continued
retention of the vessel interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign
relations." 318 U.S. at 589 (emphasis added).
Vol. 6-No. 2
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Two years later, in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 22 the issue
before the Court was whether to allow immunity to a merchant vessel
solely because it was owned, though not possessed, by a friendly
foreign government. Following a collision in Mexican waters, the
foreign vessel was libeled in California for damages to libelant's vessel.
The Mexican Ambassador filed a suggestion in the district court that
the vessel was owned and in the possession of the Republic of Mexico
and was entitled to immunity from suit. The State Department took
no position on the assertion of immunity2 3 and the district court,
finding that the Mexican Government neither operated nor possessed
the vessel, refused to recognize immunity.24 In affirming the district
court's decision, the Supreme Court enlarged its reliance on the
determinations of the executive department and announced its future
policy of avoiding embarrassment to the political branches.2" Henceforth, the courts would be bound by State Department suggestions,
and in the event that the Department were silent in a particular case,
the courts would decide in accordance with the Department's

22. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
23. The State Department's communication to the district court merely
directed the court's attention to two prior immunity cases dealing with the
"possession" issue. In the first case, Ervin v. Quintanilla, 99 F.2d 935 (5th Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 635 (1939), the court had allowed immunity
because the vessel was in the possession and service of the Mexican Government at
the time of seizure. In the second case, Compania Espanola de Navegacion
Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938), the State Department refused
to recognize the claim of immunity by the Spanish Government because it was
not proved that the vessel was either in the possession or the service of the
government.
24. The Baja California, 45 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Cal. 1942), aff'd, Republic of
Mexico v. Hoffman, 143 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1944).
25. "In the absence of recognition of the claimed immunity by the political
branch of the government, the courts may decide for themselves whether all the
requisites of immunity exist. That is to say, it is for them to decide whether the
vessel when seized was that of a foreign government and was of a character and
operated under conditions entitling it to the immunity in conformity to the
principles accepted by the department of the government charged with the
conduct of our foreign relations....
"Every judicial action exercising or relinquishing jurisdiction over the vessel of a
foreign government has its effect upon our relations with that government. Hence
it is a guiding principle in determining whether a court should exercise or
surrender its jurisdiction in such cases, that the courts should not so act as to
embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs. ..." 324 U.S. at
34-35.
Spring, 1973
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pronouncements in other cases. 6 The thrust of the Hoffman decision, then, is that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is a "political
question" more properly resolved by judicial deference to the
executive."
In 1952, the State Department announced, in the now famous
"Tate letter,"2 that it had completed a study of sovereign immunity
in the international community and that henceforth the Department
would follow the more current restrictive theory of immunity. 29 According to the restrictive theory, the sovereign or public acts (jure
imperii) of a state continue to enjoy complete immunity from suit in
United States courts, but acts of a private or commercial nature (jure
gestionis) are treated as those of any foreign commercial enterprise.
The Tate letter declared that the Department of State "realized that a

26. "It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our
government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which
the government has not seen fit to recognize." 324 U.S. at 35 (footnote
omitted). Justice Frankfurter stated in a concurring opinion: "[C]ourts should
not disclaim jurisdiction which otherwise belongs to them in relation to vessels
owned by foreign governments however operated except when 'the department of
the government charged with the conduct of our foreign relations,' or of course
Congress, explicitly asserts that the proper conduct of these relations calls for
judicial abstention. Thereby responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations
will be placed where power iles." 324 U.S. at 41-42.
27. "It must be recognized that primarily the claim by a foreign sovereign of
immunity from suit or process presents a political rather than a juridical
question." New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp.
684, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The "political question" doctrine and its correlation
with sovereign immunity is discussed notes 124-27 infra and accompanying text.
Commenting on the Hoffman decision, Judge Jessup has reasoned that the courts
should assume jurisdiction according to their own rules of law and adjudicate the
cases on the merits. Then, if the sovereign were displeased with the decision, it
could negotiate with the executive branch through normal diplomatic channels.
Jessup believes that the State Department should be consulted only as to the
factual question of status; immunity presents a legal question which should be left
wholly to the courts. Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of its
Functions?, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946).
28. Note 6 supra.
29. It was clear by this time that the majority of nations had changed, or were
in the process of changing, from the absolute to the restrictive theory of
immunity. Thus the purposes of the Tate letter were to align United States policy
with the policy of its trading partners and to ensure that foreign states received
the same treatment in domestic courts that the United States received in foreign
courts. J. SWEENEY, supra note 8; Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting
Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 93, 95 (1953).
Vol. 6-No. 2
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shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts but it is felt
that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity
where the executive has declined to do so."' 3" It is noteworthy indeed
that in less than three decades the executive department had risen
from a posture subservient to the will of the courts to a position of
formulating and directing national policy on the sovereign immunity
3
question. 1
Although the Tate letter gave the judiciary the criteria to be applied
in future cases in which a foreign state claims immunity, it failed to
define the standards adopted.3 2 Nor has it succeeded in removing the
executive branch from the judicial process. 33 In fact, while the courts
30. Tate letter, supra note 5, at 985.
31. "The practical effect of the Tate letter has been to make the Pesaro
decision a dead letter ... ." Timberg, supra note 16, at 114. See 60 MICH. L. REV.
1142 (1962). But note that the Pesaro decision has not been overruled, nor has
the Supreme Court ever applied the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The
Tate letter was cited with approval, however, in National City Bank v. Republic of
China, 348 U.S. 356, 364 (1955).
32. "[T]he 'Tate letter' offers no guide-lines or criteria for differentiating
between a sovereign's private and public acts. Nor have the courts or commentators suggested any satisfactory test. Some have looked to the nature of the
transaction, categorizing as sovereign acts only activity which could not be
performed by individuals. While this criterion is relatively easy to apply, it
ofttimes produces rather astonishing results, such as the holdings of some
European courts that purchases of bullets or shoes for the army, the erection of
fortification for defense, or the rental of a house for an embassy, are private
acts.... Others have looked to the purpose of the.transaction, categorizing asjure
imperil all activities in which the object of performance is public in character. But
this test is even more unsatisfactory, for conceptually the modern sovereign
always acts for a public purpose.... Functionally the criterion is purely arbitrary
and necessarily involves the court in projecting personal notions about the proper
realm of state functioning." Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1964) (citations and
footnotes omitted). The Second Circuit then postulated the following categories
of sovereign acts for which immunity would be granted by the court in the event
the State Department was silent or refused to allow immunity: "(1) internal
administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien; (2) legislative acts, such as
nationalization; (3) acts concerning the armed forces; (4) acts concerning
diplomatic activity; (5) public loans." 336 F.2d at 360. These criteria were not
entirely novel, but the case is the benchmark of judicial attempts to establish
some bases for decision. See Lalive, L Immunitg de Juridiction des Etats et des
Organisations Internationales, 84 RECUEIL DES COURs 205, 285-86 (1953);
Belman, supra note 3, at 183-84; Lauterpacht, supra note 8, at 236-39.
33. "Ironically, while the shift in executive policy was designed to free the
courts to adjudicate actions against foreign sovereigns, it also has had the effect of
Spring, 1973
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struggle with the uncertainties of the Tate letter, the executive
department freely departs from its announced policy when it
determines that political and foreign relations considerations are of
overriding importance.34 For example, in Rich v. Naviera Vacuba,
S.A.,
a Cuban-owned ship under the control of a defecting crew
entered a United States port the day after the Castro government had
released a hijacked American commercial aircraft. American claimants
immediately filed libels against the vessel and its cargo.3 Cuba had
explicitly waived its immunity to jurisdiction and execution on the
judgment in an earlier state court case3" and the vessel was clearly
employed by Cuba in a commercial activity. Nonetheless, the State
Department filed a suggestion of immunity with the district court. In
affirming the district court's dismissal of the suit, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated: "[W]e conclude that the
certificate and grant of immunity issued by the Department of State
should be accepted by the court without further inquiry."3 " In the

making the judiciary even more dependent upon the suggestion by the
Department of State." R. LILLICH, THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 15 (1965). See Belman, supra note 3, at 184; Leigh, New Departures in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 1969 PROC. Am.Soc'Y INT'L L. 187.
34. See Isbrandtsen Tankers Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d
24 (4th Cir. 1961); New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F.
Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of
Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966).
35. 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961), aff'g 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1961).
This case and the ramifications of the court's decision are discussed extensively in
R. FALic, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 145-58 (1964); R. LILLICH, supra note 33, at 15-44; Cardozo,
Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative
or Abdication to Usurper?, 48 CORNELL L. REV. 461, 468-82 (1963).
36. Two longshoremen sued to recover an outstanding judgment granted by
United States courts against the Republic of Cuba and Naviera Vacuba, the former
owner of the nationalized vessel. A second libel was filed by a judgment creditor
who had recovered the judgment in a Louisiana court by consent of Cuba. The
United Fruit Sugar Company also filed a libel against the sugar cargo, which it
claimed was confiscated without compensation by the Cuban Government. Libel
for wages was also filed by the defecting master and crew. 295 F.2d at 25.
37. Mayan Lines, S.A. had obtained a $500,000 judgment against the
Republic of Cuba in a Louisiana court. The Cuban government had specifically
waived immunity in that case both with respect to the adjudication of liability
and to the enforcement of the judgment by execution. 295 F.2d at 25.
38. 295 F.2d at 26. In addition, the Fourth Circuit stated: "We think that the
doctrine of the separation of powers under our Constitution requires us to assume
Vol. 6-No. 2
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final analysis, therefore, the Tate letter has not accomplished
intransigent application of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity by American courts, nor has it provided private litigants with even a
modicum of certainty that their claims will be heard in suits against
foreign states.3 9 In sum, when the executive department determines
that recognition of sovereign immunity is required for harmonization
of relations with a foreign state, the plaintiff's claim and the Tate
letter doctrine are sacrificed to the exigencies of international affairs.
B. Immunity from Set-Off and Counterclaim
A foreign sovereign bringing suit in a United States court implicitly
subjects itself to the jurisdiction and rules of procedure of the
forum.4" Moreover, it is now settled in the United States that a
foreign sovereign seeking the assistance of domestic courts on its
claims is liable for defendant's set-offs and counterclaims based on the
subject matter of the foreign sovereign's suit,4 1 as well as for those
which are unrelated to the original cause of action.4 2 In the leading
case of National City Bank v. Republic of China,43 the Chinese
Government brought suit against defendant bank to recover 200,000
dollars deposited by an agency of the government. Defendant asserted

that all pertinent considerations have been taken into account by the Secretary of
State in reaching his conclusion." 295 F.2d at 26.
39. The political background of the Rich case tends to absolve the executive
department from claims of usurpation. The agreement by Cuba to return the
aircraft, however, was not conditioned upon the return of the vessel in the Rich
case, but upon the promise of the United States to release a Cuban patrol boat.
The correspondence between the United States and Cuba appears in 45 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 407-08 (1961). The State Department's decision to suggest
immunity for the Cuban vessel was far-sighted diplomacy which bore fruit in
future hijacking of American airliners. See 1 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN
INTRODUCTORY
COURSE 87-111 (1968); H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,

554 (1968); Note, The Castro Government in American Courts: Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1607 (1962); note 36 supra.
40. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 134 (1938); The
Secundus, 15 F.2d 713 (E.D.N.Y. 1926). See generally S. SUCHARITKUL, supra
note 7, at 352-54.
41. Republic of China v. American Express Co., 195 F.2d 230, 233 (2d Cir.
1952); Hungarian People's Republic v. Cecil Associates, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 954,
957 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); French Republic v. Inland Navigation Co., 263 F. 410,411
(E.D. Mo. 1920).
42. See note 44 infra and accompanying text; Annot., 99 L. Ed. 403 (1955).
43. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS
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two counterclaims based on defaulted treasury notes of the Republic
of China owned by the bank and- sought an affirmative judgment of
1,634,432 dollars. The lower courts had dismissed the counterclaims
on the ground of sovereign immunity because the counterclaims
were not based on the subject matter of plaintiff's suit" and had
refused to allow defendant to amend the counterclaims by denominating them set-offs. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
same policy considerations of "fair play" apply regardless of whether
the counterclaim or set-off is based on the subject matter or
transaction out of which the suit arose.4"
The Republic of China decision left unresolved the problem of
distinguishing between acts jure imperii46 and acts jure gestionis, and
the question of bringing affirmative counterclaims in which the
amount claimed by the defendant exceeds that sought by the foreign
sovereign.4 These questions, however, pose no difficulty under the
restrictive theory of immunity and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Since a foreign state waives its immunity when it initiates a
suit in a United States court, the defendant cannot be stripped of his
defenses by a claim of sovereign immunity, even when the state's
claim is based on a sovereign or public act. In such cases, a
counterclaim should be permitted, but only to the extent of the
original claim because the state would not otherwise be liable under

44. Republic of China v. National City Bank, 208 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1953),
aff'g 108 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The Department of State gave the courts
no indication that allowance of the counterclaims would be detrimental to the
foreign relations policies of the United States with respect to China. 348 U.S. at
364.
45. "[T]he limitation of 'based on the subject matter' is too indeterminate,
indeed too capricious, to mark the bounds of the limitations on the doctrine of
sovereign immunity." 348 U.S. at 364-65.
46. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text. The Republic of China did
argue that the counterclaim was based on a public debt which would fall within
the immune category of the Tate letter. The Court, however, offhandedly
dismissed this plea: "This is not to be denied, but it is beside the point." 348 U.S.
at 364.
47. This question was not before the court because defendant had amended
its complaint and sought only a set-off. The traditional United States rule
prohibits affirmative counterclaims against a foreign state. See, e.g., In re
Patterson-MacDonald Shipbuilding Co., 293 F. 192 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 264
U.S. 582 (1923); French Republic v. Inland Navigation Co. 263 F. 410, 412 (E.D.
Mo. 1920); Hungarian People's Republic v. Cecil Associates, Inc., 118 F. Supp.
954, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In admiralty cases affirmative counterclaims have
always been permitted. See, e.g., United States v. Norwegian Barque "Thekla,"
266 U.S. 328 (1924), affg The Gloria, 286 F. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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the restrictive theory of immunity. When the foreign state commences a suit based on a private or commercial act, however, an
affirmative counterclaim should not be denied. In these cases, the
question is not whether the counterclaim is related to the cause of
action, but whether the foreign state could be sued independently
under the restrictive theory. If the sovereign would be liable
independently of its own private claim, the better approach would be
to allow the defendant's affirmative counterclaim for reasons of
fairness, convenience and judicial economy.4"
C. Commencement of Suit Against a Foreign Sovereign

Acquisition of personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign, its
agencies or instrumentalities, presents an obstacle for an American
plaintiff, even though United States courts clearly have subject matter

jurisdiction under the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 4 9 Attempts to acquire in personam jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign by

48. The

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF THE

FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 70(2) (1965)
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW does

[hereinafter cited as
not support this view:
"(2) A state initiating proceedings in a court of another state is not immune from
(a) a counterclaim to the extent that it does not exceed the amount of the state's
claims, or (b) a counterclaim, regardless of amount, arising from the same subject
matter as the state's claim." Neither the text nor the comments of the
Restatement mention the private versus public acts distinction, even though § 69
adopts the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. Consequently, under the
Restatement view, all that need be satisfied for an affirmative counterclaim is that
it be based on the same subject matter as the state's claim. The Reporter's Notes,
however, cite to a state court decision which supports either § 70(2) (b) or the
view expressed in text preceeding this note. See Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S.
Int'l Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
49. See New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp.
684 (1955) (foreign state's bank accounts held immune from attachment in aid of
jurisdiction on suggestion of State Department, even though defendant probably
would not have been entitled to immunity if court had heard case on merits of
plaintiff's claim). State Department practice on this issue, however, has since been
modified. See generally Collins, The Effectiveness of the Restrictive Theory of
Sovereign Immunity, 4 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 119, 125-36 (1955).
50. Purdy Co. v. Argentina, 333 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 962 (1965); Oster v. Dominion of Canada, 144 F. Supp. 746 (N.D.N.Y.),
aff'd sub nom. Clay v. Dominion of Canada, 238 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957); see Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April
24, 1963, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/12, in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 995 (1963) (ratified
by the United States on November 24, 1969).
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service of process on consular ° and diplomatic officers"1 have been
uniformally held invalid.5 2
Attachment in rem of a foreign sovereign's assets has been the most
successful method of acquiring jurisdiction, particularly in admiralty
cases.5 3 Even after adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, however, the Department of State continued to suggest
immunity in cases in which a foreign state's nonmaritime assets, such
as bank accounts, were attached. This policy now has been reversed,
and unless the State Department suggests immunity 5 the courts may
permit attachment, 6 particularly if the account is not used for

51. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (the
Department of State, replying to a request of the court, opined that service on the
Tunesian Ambassador would prejudice United States foreign relations and
probably would impair performance of diplomatic functions). See Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 20/13
(1961), in 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 1064 (1961).
52. Moreover, service of process on ambassadors and public ministers of a
foreign sovereign is subject to criminal penalty. 22 U.S.C. § § 252-53 (1970). If
suit were to be brought against a commercial enterprise of a foreign state
operating within the United States, chances are greater that a plaintiff would be
able to locate and serve process on a manager or business agent who would not be
considered immune. In such cases the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be
employed. See generally Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d
103 (2d Cir. 1966); H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 39, at 578-79.
53. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. at 578 (1943); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271
U.S. 562 (1926); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812). In cases in which a ship is attached for purposes of acquiring jurisdiction
in a nonmaritime cause of action, however, the suit may be dismissed for want of
admiralty jurisdiction. American Hawaiian Ventures, Inc. v. M.V.J. Latuharhary,
257 F. Supp. 622 (D.N.J. 1966).
54. New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684
(1955).
55. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Embassy of South Vietnam, 275 F. Supp. 860
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (mem.) (court deferred to a State Department communication suggesting both immunity from attachment of foreign state's bank account and immunity from suit).
56. See note 50 supra. In Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d
1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959), the State Department modified its view
and in a letter submitted to the court stated that execution on a foreign
sovereign's assets in satisfaction of a judgment was violative of international law,
but attachment for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction need not in all cases be
prohibited. The letter is reproduced in 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 643 (1960). See Three
Stars Trading Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 32 Misc. 2d 4, 222 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Sup. Ct.
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"purely governmental" purposes. 57
Under present law, service of process abroad or service by mail on a
foreign state is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a United States
court."8 In two recent Second Circuit decisions, however, extraterritorial service was upheld for purposes of informing the foreign
sovereign of the commencement of proceedings when personal
jurisdiction was deemed to have been obtained by agreement to
arbitrate in the United States.5 9
The current procedural ambiguities have been criticized on the
grounds that present domestic concepts of jurisdiction are sufficient
to confer personal jurisdiction over a foreign state's commercial
activities in the United States. Moreover, permitting attachment of a
foreign state's assets during the period of litigation can be a source of
financial and political embarrassment to the foreign state and might
seriously aggravate foreign relations with that nation.6"

1961) (attachment of debts owed by American citizens to Cuban Government
permitted for purposes of obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction); 6 M. WHITEMAN,
supra note 8, at 686-95; Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 921-26.
57. Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So.2d 687 (Fla.
D. Ct. App. 1961) (attachment in aid of jurisdiction permitted when plaintiff
attached chattels of garnished debts owed to Cuba that were not "directly
related" to activities of public or sovereign nature); cf. Flota Maritima Browning
de Cuba, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964);
Three Stars Trading Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 32 Misc. 2d 4, 222 N.Y.S.2d 675
(Sup. Ct. 1961); Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 923-24.
58. Purdy Co. v. Argentina, 333 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 962 (1965) (service abroad by mail in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the state's long-arm statute held insufficient to establish jurisdiction).
59. In Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965),
service of a petition to arbitrate under the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§ 4 (1970), was effected by registered mail at the Madrid office of defendant. The
method of service was held sufficient to give notice and not violative of due
process because defendant was deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of
the court by agreeing to arbitrate in New York. "[W]e see no reason to treat a
commercial branch of a foreign sovereign differently from a foreign corporation.... Implicit in the agreement to arbitrate is consent to enforcement of that
agreement." 336 F.2d at 363-64. To the same effect is the decision in Petrol
Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966).
60. Belman, supra note 3, at 184; Leigh, supra note 33, at 188-90.
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D. Execution in Satisfaction of a Judgment
If the plaintiff is able to obtain jurisdiction over the foreign
sovereign, and if his claim is adjudicated by "permission" of the
Department of State, and if he is awarded a judgment against the

foreign sovereign, his efforts will have been for naught if the foreign
state refuses to pay the amount awarded.61 The United States still
adheres to the absolute theory of sovereign immunity regarding
execution on assets of foreign states located within this country.6 2 Thus, even if the plaintiff had acquired jurisdiction by
attachment, the attached assets cannot be utilized to satisfy the
judgment and must be released.63 Moreover, a waiver of immunity has

61. Fortunately, it is an uncommon occurrence for a state to refuse to satisfy
a final judgment rendered against it. Most nations possessing commercial assets in
the United States desire reciprocal treatment for their nationals and realize the
benefits to be gained in maintaining good diplomatic and commercial relations
with this country. Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 928-29.
62. See Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and SelfDeception, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION 40, 53-57
(1961). The Tate letter was silent on the question of execution, but the State
Department's view was communicated to the courts in the case of Weilamann v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1085, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959). The
Department's letter is not published in the opinion, but may be examined in 6 M.
WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 709-12. The letter states in part: "The Department
has always recognized the distinction 'immunity from jurisdiction' and 'immunity
from execution'. The Department has maintained the view that under international law property of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution to satisfy
even a judgment obtained in an action against a foreign sovereign where there is
no immunity from suit.
"As you will recall there is precedent for not permitting execution of judgment
obtained in a proceeding when the foreign sovereign has consented to suit. Dexter
and Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyvelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir., 1930);
followed in Bradford v. Chase National Bank, 24 F. Supp. 23, 38 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.
1938). Where the foreign sovereign has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court it would be an a fortiori case." A similar State Department letter was filed
with the court in Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222
N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961), but the court held that the suggestion that the foreign state
was immune from execution was inapposite to the assets of defendant bank,
which was an independent jural entity, separate from the foreign state
government.
63. The letter cited in note 62 supra continued: "The Department is of the
further view that even when the attachment of the property of a foreign sovereign
is not prohibited for purpose of jurisdiction, nevertheless the property so attached
and levied upon cannot be retained to satisfy a judgment ensuing from the suit
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been construed not to constitute an expression of consent to
execution on an adverse judgment.6 4
One reason for this anomalous policy on execution is that both the
federal government and the state governments are deemed immune
from execution of judgments of United States citizens. 6 5 Consequently, it would be both improvident and detrimental to international
relations for American -courts to subject foreign sovereigns to more
rigorous treatment than the domestic sovereign. An additional reason
is the very serious nature of an execution and sale of a foreign
government's property in satisfaction of a judgment." For a domestic
court to make such a decision unilaterally could have a dramatic effect
on the executive's conduct of foreign affairs, notwithstanding the
executive's refusal to suggest jurisdictional immunity in the same case.
In short, the present state of the law requires that the plaintiff take his
unsatisfied judgment to courts of the foreign state or request that the
Department of State make a diplomatic claim against the foreign state
in his behalf.6"

."
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 69 (1965) states: "Caveat: The Institute expresses

no opinion as to whether property of a foreign state connected with a commercial
activity of the state may be subjected to execution in satisfaction of a judgment
otherwise than as stated in this Section." The Reporter's Notes to § 69 of the
Restatement indicate that the State Department's views cannot be regarded as a
prevailing rule of international law. For purposes of execution many states now
distinguish between property connected with private acts and public acts and
accord immunity only to the latter. See Garcia-Mora, supra note 8, at 359;
Lauterpacht, supra note 8, at 242-43; Leigh, supra note 33, at 189-93.
64. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1930). The judgment against Sweden in this case was eventually settled by
diplomatic claim. See Kuhn, Immunity of the Property of ForeignStates Against
Execution, 28 Am.J. INT'L L. 119 (1934). But see Flota Maritima Browning de
Cuba, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964)
in absence of any statement from Department of State, general appearance by
foreign sovereign without reservation of any claim of immunity manifested both
its consent to suit and consent to an execution on the judgment).
65. Cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). For a discussion on this
point see Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 927-29.
66. Although writers often criticize the doctrine of absolute immunity with
respect to executions, it is nowhere suggested that state property used for purely
governmental purposes, such as warships and embassy property, be levied on to
satisfy a judgment. See, e.g., S. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 7, at 347-48;
Lauterpacht, supra note 8, at 243.
67. Recovery by diplomatic claim is at best slow-at worst, the Department
may not take up the claim at all. See Fenstervald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet
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Ill.

THE PROPOSED STATUTE: A SECTION-BY-SECTION
ANALYSIS

This Part examines seriatim each section of the proposed statute,

"Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States." According to John R.
Stevenson, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, the proposed
statute culminates four years of research and drafting and "reflects the
most modern thinking on the law governing when foreign states
should be subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts."6 The
stated purpose of the bill is to allay the criticism of the international
bar relating to the present inadequate and confused practice in
sovereign immunity cases. Thus the statute incorporates significant
changes in United States law in matters relating to jurisdiction,
attachment, service of process and execution. Furthermore, the
drafters of the bill have announced that if the proposed statute is
enacted the Department of State will seek a declaration that the
United States accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, on condition of reciprocity,
with respect to disputes
69
concerning the immunity of foreign states.
A. GuidingPrinciples
The first section (§ 1602) of the proposed legislation announces
the principles that are to guide the courts in future cases involving
sovereign immunity questions. First, the bill assumes that the interests
of justice and of the parties will be served best by the determination
of a claim of state immunity by the judicial branch of government.
The bill does not provide procedures for executive department
intervention in the judicial process. State Department foreclosure
from sovereign immunity cases undoubtedly will become the focal
point for controversy on the bill because of the ramifications on the
executive's conduct of foreign affairs." Secondly, the proposed
State Trading, 63 HARV. L. REV. 614, 622-23 (1950). A provocative alternative
to this procedure, suggested by NATO and Status of Forces Agreements, is that
the United States indemnify the successful plaintiff. The costs for such a program
could be allocated to governmental expense for the maintenance of friendly
foreign relations. Lauterpacht, supra note 8, at 243; 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 264, 268-72 (1971).
68. See note 1 supra.
69. Letter from the Departments of State and Justice to the President of the
Senate, January 22, 1973. The letter is reproduced in 12 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 118, 121-22 (1973). This proposal runs headlong into the
"Connolly Reservation," 15 DEP'T STATE BULL. 452-53 (1946). The problem
raised by this proposal is not within the scope of this topic.
70. See notes 142-71 infra and accompanying text.
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statute adopts the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as the
standard of international law to be applied by the courts in determining
whether to grant jurisdictional immunity." Thirdly, the first section
[states'] commercial
states that "[u] nder international law ...
property[2] may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments
rendered against them in connection with their commercial activities."
While it may seem desirable to implement this provision, it is by no
means clear whether it represents an accurate statement of international law. A considerable number of states still adhere to the absolute
theory of sovereign immunity concerning execution on the property
of a foreign sovereign. 73 Indeed, this provision does not even reflect
the present posture of the United States on this issue. 4
B. Definitions
Section 1603 defines two terms that are used throughout the
proposed statute. The term "foreign state" compromises the central
government, a political subdivision, or an agency or instrumentality of
a foreign state-or political subdivision, except as the term is used in
sections 1608 and 1610. Under the traditional rules, immunity usually
extends only to the central government. 7 5 Constituent units and

71. It is now apparent that the restrictive theory of jurisdictional immunity of
foreign states is the international standard. See notes 5, 8 & 29 supra.
72. The bill wisely refrains from attempting to define "commercial property."
An attempt to define precisely the term could have a negative or restraining effect
and make necessary strained constructions by the courts.
73. "[D]oes not immunity from seizure-whether by way of attachment or
execution-constitute a rule of international law so generally accepted that any
departure from it would constitute a most drastic innovation?" Lauterpacht,
supra note 8, at 241. See 6 G. WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 709-26;
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, Reporter'sNotes, supra note
48, at 215-18 (1965).
74. Moreover, the Belman-Lowenfeld Proposal of 1969 recommended that
the United States retain the absolute theory of sovereign immunity with respect
to execution on the assets of a foreign state located in this country. See notes 3 &
8 supra.
75. Traditionally, the United States accords immunity to the agencies and
instrumentalities of a foreign government when they are found to be unincorporated organizations or associations. When the agency or instrumentality is
found to be a corporation, immunity is generally denied on the ground that the
corporation is an entity separate from the government. See, e.g., S.T. Tringali Co.
v. Tug Pemex XV, 274 F. Supp. 227 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Mirabella v. Banco
Industrial De La Republica Argentina, 38 Misc. 2d 128, 237 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup.
Ct. 1963). Contra, F. W. Stone Engineering Co. v. Petroleos of Mexico, 352 Pa.
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political subdivisions having no political independence of the state,
such as protectorates, provinces and cities, are not entitled to
immunity.7 6 The bill would extend the protection of sovereign
immunity to the public acts of subdivisions of a foreign state and its
agencies and instrumentalities on the theory that no reason exists to
treat them differently when their acts are not of a commercial
character and when the acts could be imputed to the central
77
government.
Section 1603(b) defines the term "commercial activity" as either a
"regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act," as determined by the "nature" of the activity
rather than its "purpose." It is ironic that this bill, which purports to
embody the most modem thinking on the law governing sovereign
immunity, reverts to the "nature" test that the courts have criticized
'
as unworkable and "purely arbitrary." 79
A test constructed along the
lines suggested by the Second Circuit in the Victory Transport
case80 would seem considerably more manageable and would allow
the courts sufficient latitude in deciding whether the conduct under
scrutiny was a "commercial activity" or a sovereign function. One
further problem posed by the "nature" of the act approach is that an
initial determination must be made whether to apply the forum's law,
the foreign state's law or international law before the courts can
characterize the nature of the conduct as commercial.
C. JurisdictionalImmunity and Exceptions
Section 1604 stipulates that a foreign state shall be immune from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, except as otherwise
provided under the statute. The drafters' intent is that this presumption of immunity will aid the foreign state in doubtful cases.8" This
section states, however, that existing and future international agreements by the United States shall not be altered by the proposed

12, 42 A.2d 57 (1945); United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56
N.E.2d 577 (1944). See Note, The JurisdictionalImmunity of Foreign Sovereigns,
63 YALE L. J. 1148, 1152-55 (1954).
76. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 48,
§ 67; Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(a), at 475.
77. Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 2, at 134-37.
78. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
79. For a discussion on the problems engendered by the use of the "nature or
purpose" tests see note 32 supra.
80. Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
See Bishop, supra note 29, at 103-05; supra note 32.
81. See Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 2, at 137.
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statute. Thus treaties and agreements entered into by the United
States with foreign nations shall be the governing body of law on
immunity that the courts must apply in suits against those nations,8 2 even when the jurisdictional standards in such agreements are
more lenient than those of statute.
The exceptions to the presumption of immunity from jurisdiction
are set forth in section 1605. Section 1605(1) provides that in cases in
which the foreign state has either explicitly or implicitly waived its
immunity, immunity may not thereafter be reinstated after a claim
against the state has arisen. In some past cases, a foreign state would
repudiate a waiver after the claim against it had arisen and seek a
suggestion of immunity from the State Department.8 3 This procedure
was patently unfair to businessmen when the waiver was explicitly
stated in a commercial contract or when reliance had been placed on a
treaty. The waiver provision of the bill insures that contractual
promises of waiver by a foreign sovereign will be honored in the event
of a breach of contract.
Section 1605(2) establishes three bases of "long arm" jurisdiction
over the commercial activities of a foreign state. First, a foreign state
loses its jurisdictional immunity when the action is based on a
commercial activity within the United States. This proviso codifies the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. Secondly, section 1605(2)
exempts from the general provision of jurisdictional imniunity any
suit based on acts of a foreign state performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere.
The mere fact that an act occurred in the United States in connection
with a foreign state's commercial activities elsewhere is sufficient to
destroy the state's immunity, even though the act itself has no impact
in the United States. 4 This provision is an invitation to the exercise

82. See, e.g., Treaty with Israel on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
Aug. 23, 1951, art. XVIII, para. 3, [1954] 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948;
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 27, 1958, § III,
U.N. Doc. A/CoNF.13/L.52, noted in S. SUCHARITICUL, supra note 7,at 100-02.
83. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.
1964); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); United States
of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577 (1944); RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 48, § 70; cf. Petrol Shipping Corp.
v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966).
84. The bill adopts the territorial principle of jurisdiction set forth in the
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 48, § 17: "A
State has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law (a) attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or not such consequences are
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of over-extended jurisdiction. In its present, unqualified form, the
provision is not supported by any present concept of jurisdiction or
rule of law and could only be the result of hasty drafting.8" Thirdly,
conduct occurring outside the United States in connection with the
commercial activity of a foreign state that has a direct effect within
the territory of the United States also destroys the presumption of
immunity found in section 1604. While this principle of territorial
jurisdiction has been in effect for many years in the United States,
particularly with respect to foreign corporations engaging in restrictive
trade practices, 6 it has never been applied by an American court
against a foreign state.8 7 Nonetheless, the provision is logically sound
and does not seem to infringe unduly upon a foreign state's

determined by the effects of the conduct outside the territory, and (b) relating to
a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory." No cases
are cited by the Restatement to support this rule. See note 85 infra.
85. Note that subsection (b) of the Restatement § 17, supra note 84, is not
particularized in § 1605(2), cl. 2, of the proposed statute. The Section-by-Section
Analysis, supra note 2, at 140, states, however, that an act falling within this
clause "must have a sufficient connection with the United States to justify the
jurisdiction of the United States courts over the matter." This statement is in line
with present concepts of jurisdiction over foreign corporations "doing business"
or having "minimum contacts" with the United States. In all events, the
commercial activity of the foreign nation and the foreign state act complained of
must have a reasonable relationship with the United States. See Belman, supra
note 3, at 185. It is submitted that the language of the Section-by-Section
Analysis be articulated in § 1605(2), cl. 2, in order to ensure that standards of
due process are not offended. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
86. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690 (1962); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States
v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1968); Haight, InternationalLaw and ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antitrust
Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954); Oliver, ExtraterritorialApplication of United
States Legislation Against Restrictive or Unfair Trade Practices, 51 AM. J. INT'L
L. 380 (1957); Timberg, Antitrust and Foreign Trade, 48 Nw. U. L. REV. 411

(1953).
87. The Restatement notes that under international law a state may be held
liable for damages that it causes within the territory of another state where the

conduct is caused by activities within the negligent state's borders. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW supra note 48, Reporters Notes, § 18,

at 55; Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada),. 8 Arb. Series (1941)
(Canada held responsible for producing fumes that polluted the air in the United
States).
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sovereignty. The statute merely applies the same jurisdictional
standards that are currently applied to foreign privately-owned
commercial enterprises organized under foreign law and insures that a
state will be liable to the same extent when it engages in commercial
activities. 88
Section 1605(3) eliminates a foreign state's immunity when rights
to property "taken in violation of international law" are in issue and
the contested property (or property exchanged for such property) is
found within the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state.8 9 The bill makes no attempt
to define when property is taken in violation of international law.
Presumably, the drafters intend that the traditional standard of
"prompt, adequate and effective compensation" will govern the
courts' decisions whether to grant immunity, but it is by no means
clear that there exists an international consensus on this or any other
standard.9"
It is clear that this provision unnecessarily forces the courts to
recognize or deny the validity of a foreign state's taking of property
without providing adequate guides to make such a decision. Consequently, this provisision thrusts United States courts into the
labyrinth of an area of international law from which there is presently
no satisfactory egress. In addition, the courts will become embroiled
in investigations and complex problems of tracing the property and
88. For an analysis of the bases and range of international jurisdiction see R.
supra note 35, at 21-63.
89. § 1605(3) further states that, when property is taken in violation of
international law and when that "property or any property exchanged for such
property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign
state or of a political subdivision of the foreign state and that agency or
instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States," the
foreign state is not entitled to immunity from jurisdiction. Since under § 1603 a
foreign state is defined to include political subdivisions, or agencies or
instrumentalities of a foreign state or political subdivision, this provision seems
redundant.
90. The act of state doctrine and the question of international consensus on
what constitutes an unlawful taking of property are beyond the scope of this
Note. For a discussion of the correlation between the act of state, sovereign
immunity and political question doctrines, however, see notes 124-27 infra and
accompanying text. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964), rev g 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); R. FALK, supra note 35, at 64-138; Dawson & Weston, Banco Nacionalde
Cuba v. Sabbatino: New Wine in Old Bottles, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 63 (1963);
Lillich, supra note 33, at 45-111; Maier, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State:
Correlativeor Conflicting Policies?, 35 U. CIN. L. REv. 556 (1966).
FALK,
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assets of a foreign state that could be thwarted by an uncooperative
foreign state defendant. Finally, this provision could affect relations
between the United States and nations that have not taken property in
violation of international law, but have acquired such property
through exchange or purchase and have brought the tainted property
to the United States in connection with its commercial activities. 91 For these reasons, it is submitted that section 1605(3) be
deleted from the proposed statute. In cases in which confiscated
property is found in the possession of a foreign state in connection
with its commercial activities in the United States, section 1605(2)
would seem sufficient to permit the courts to assert jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction having been obtained (without the attendant problems
discussed above) an act of state defense could be interposed, if
appropriate, by the defendant foreign state,92 or raised as a bar to
adjudication by the court or by the executive branch.
Section 1604(4) adopts the traditional exception to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in cases in which a claim against a foreign state is
based on real, or immovable property, or on property acquired by
inheritance or gift. International law makes no distinction between
property of a commercial or public character; the basis of the
exception is the theory that land, and objects permanently attached
thereto, form an indivisible part of the territorial sovereignty. If a
foreign state could acquire real property within the territory of
another state free of its jurisdiction, it would constitute a derogation
of the territorial state's sovereignty and an impermissible extension of
the sovereignty of the foreign state. Consequently, a foreign sovereign
acquires the property subject to the jurisdiction and rules of law of
the territorial sovereign. When a foreign state takes property, real or
personal, by gift or succession, the state is subject to the laws of the
territorial sovereign to the same extent as a private individual.93

91. See Lowenfeld, The Sabbatino Amendment-International Law Meets
Civil Procedure, 59 Am. J. INT'L L. 899, 900-02 (1965).
92. This reasoning is flawed by the inclusion of the "nature" test under
section 1603(b). Using that test, the expropriation of property is undeniably a
governmental or public act. Consequently, one provision of the proposed statute
would grant immunity in cases involving confiscated property, while another
would deny the immunity defense. This absurd result supports the suggestion to
eliminate the nature test. See Maier, supra note 90, at 568-69.
93. See generally E. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 15-17, 44-46, 88; RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra

note 48, § 68; J. SWEENEY,

supra note 8, at i-ii; Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 8, art. 10, at 590;
Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 2, at 141-42; Tate letter, supra note 5; cf.
Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S: 472 (1924).
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The final exception to the jurisdictional immunity of foreign states
is set forth in section 1605(5). Under this provision, a foreign state is
subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts for claims based on
injury or death, property damage or loss caused by a wrongful act or
omission of any official or employee of the foreign state. The
wrongful act or omission must occur in the United States and must
not be one for which a remedy already exists under Article VIII of the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement. 4 The stated purpose of this
provision is to insure that victims of automobile accidents caused by
officials or employees of foreign states will be compensated for their
losses.9" This provision is broadly stated, however, in order to cover
other tortious conduct of such officials or employees.9 6 When the
tort is connected with a foreign state's commercial activity, however,
section 1605(2) would be the operative provision.
Section 1606 grants immunity to a foreign state in connection with
its public debt. A "foreign state" under this section, however, includes
only the central government, not its political subdivisions, or the
agencies or instrumentalities of the state or subdivisions. 97 The bill
does not define "public debt," but the Section-by-Section Analysis
states that the term includes debt obligations to a lending bank,
securities and bonds issued by a foreign state. 8 Under this section,
therefore, a bank, private lender or bondholder could not bring suit
for default of principal or interest payments on the public debt of a
foreign state, nor could assets of the foreign state located within the
United States be attached for purposes of acquiring jurisdiction. A
foreign state may waive its immunity under this section, however, and
would probably do so in cases in which it otherwise would have
difficulty in floating its issue or in obtaining a loan.9 9 This section

94. Agreement with the Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
95. Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 2, at 142-43.
96. Section 1605(5) should be considered in connection with United States
and international law regarding diplomatic and consular immunity. See notes 51 &
52 supra; RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 48, at
228-301.
97. See § 1606(a) (2). This difference in treatment is not provided for in §
1603(a), the definitional section that includes a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality in the meaning of "foreign state," except for § 1608 and § 1610. This
oversight should be corrected.
98. Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 2, at 143-44.
99. Unlike § 1605(1), § 1606(a) (1) requires an explicit Waiver of immunity
on the foreign state's public debt.
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further provides that the federal securities laws remain fully applicable
to a foreign state issuing bonds or other securities in the United
States. 10 0
D. Counterclaims
Section 1607 of the proposed statute adopts the Restatement
position on counterclaims against foreign states.' 0 ' Thus any counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, 0 2 may be brought against the
foreign state and may exceed the state's claim if it arises out of the
same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
foreign state's claim. If the counterclaim is not based on the subject
matter of the foreign state's claim, however, it may not exceed the
amount sought by the foreign state. Attempts to determine whether
the counterclaim is "based on the same subject matter of the suit"
have produced strained interpretations and diversity of opinion among
the courts. Moreover, the Supreme Court criticized this approach in
Republic of China.03 It is submitted that this section should be
drafted to conform to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,
which is stated in section 1602 to be the guiding principle governing
this proposed legislation; the counterclaims provision would be more
aptly based on a determination whether the counterclaim arises out of
a commercial activity of the foreign state. If so, then any counterclaim-permissive or compulsory-should be permitted without restricting the dollar amount, since the jurisdictional standard is
satisfied. If the counterclaim is based on an act jure imperii, however, the counterclaim should be limited to a set-off of the foreign
state's claim. 0 4
E. Proceduresfor Commencing a Suit Against a ForeignState
At present, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not include
procedures for instituting suits against foreign governments. Con100. The following securities laws, as well as those to be enacted in the
future, are applicable to foreign states: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § § 77a
et seq. (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § § 78a et seq. (1970);
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § § 78aaa et seq. (1970);
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § § 79 et seq. (1970);
Investment Companies and Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § § 80a-1 et seq.
(1970).
101. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW, supra note 49, §
70(2).
102. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)-(b).
103. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
104. See notes 41-49 supra and accompanying text.
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sequently, section 1608 of the proposed statute was drafted to fill
that gap and to provide simple procedures for service of process in
suits against foreign states."' 5 The function of section 1608 is to give
the foreign state notice of an impending claim; jurisdiction is not
bestowed by this section, but by section 1605. In the case of a claim
against a foreign state or its political subdivision, the clerk of the court
would be responsible for addressing and dispatching a copy of the
summons and complaint by registered or certified mail to the
ambassador or chief of the mission of the foreign state accredited to
the government of the United States. In addition, the clerk would
send two copies of the summons and complaint to the Secretary of
State of the United States, who in turn would transmit one of these
copies by diplomatic note to the department of the government of the
foreign state charged with the conduct of that state's foreign relations.
In the event of a suspension of diplomatic relations with the foreign
state, service would be made in the above manner on the ambassador
or chief of mission of the state which is acting as the protecting power
for the defendant foreign state. In the case of a claim against an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, or political subdivision
thereof, that is not a citizen of the United States, the claimant would
have the option of using the above procedure or serving an officer or
agent authorized to receive service of process under the law of the
foreign state or under the laws of the United States. If the latter
procedure is employed, two copies of the complaint and summons
would be required to be sent to the Secretary of State of the United
States, who would then send a copy by diplomatic note to the foreign
affairs office of the foreign state.

105. Under the proposed statute, title 28 of the United States Code would be
amended to add section 1330, which would grant the district courts original
jurisdiction over civil claims against foreign states and their political subdivisions,
and over the agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states and subdivisions that
are not citizens of the United States. In this regard see the proposed amendments
to 28 U.S.C. § § 1391, 1332(a) (2)-(3) (1970), supra note 2, at 131-32. In the
event an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state or subdivision is incorporated
under the laws of a state of the United States or has its principal place of business
in a state of the United States, the agency or instrumentality is deemed a citizen
of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)-(d) (1970). In that case, §
1608 does not apply and the plaintiff must proceed in accordance with FED. R.
Civ. P. 4. Additionally, the agency or instrumentality that is defined as a citizen
of the United States under § 1332(c)-(d) cannot be sued in a federal district court
unless the jurisdictional requirements of diversity of citizenship or federal
question are satisfied.
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This section establishes a much needed uniform procedure for
obtaining service of process on foreign state defendants. 0 6 At
present, acquisition of jurisdiction over a foreign state is a haphazard
process involving in rem and quasi in rem attachments of assets."0 7 Attachment as a means of obtaining jurisdiction over a
foreign sovereign is a highly unsatisfactory procedure that often
impounds a state's assets for extended periods or requires the state to
post bond in order to free the assets for use during the pending
litigation. 0 8 In addition, attachment might be considered a serious
affront to the sovereignty of a foreign state, as well as a threat to its
financial security, and could cause disruption in the friendly intercourse between that state and the United States. This section obviates
the attachment process and, since the service of the summons and
complaint is by mail, maintains the inviolability of the diplomatic
representative of the foreign state.' 0 9 Moreover, notification by the
two-pronged procedure for service of process assures that due process
will not be violated and serves the additional function of keeping the
State Department informed of suits against foreign states.
F. Immunity from Attachment and Execution
Section 1609 provides that a foreign state's assets in the United
States shall be immune from attachment and from execution." 0 Immunity from attachment for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction is

106. Since the jurisdiction of the federal district courts is not exclusive, the
plaintiff may proceed against a foreign state or its political subdivision, or an
agency or instrumentality of a political subdivision that is not a citizen of the
United States in a state court. The proposed statute, however, would amend 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (1970) by adding a new subsection permitting removal by the
foreign state from a state court to a federal district court in the district and
division where the action is pending. This amendment would help to insure that
decisions concerning the immunity of foreign states would be uniform under the
statute. Actions commenced in state courts against agencies or instrumentalities of
a foreign state that are classified as citizens of the United States would remain
subject to the existing provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
107. See notes 49-61 supra and accompanying text.
108. Moreover, attachment affords the plaintiff little relief because the assets
attached for jurisdictional purposes cannot be levied on in satisfaction of a
judgment. The entire procedure is highly artificial in suits against foreign
states. See notes 49-60 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 49-53 supra and accompanying text.
110. Section 1609 creates a presumption of immunity where an exception is
not clearly specified in § 1610. In doubtful cases, therefore, immunity from
execution will be afforded the foreign state.
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made conclusive by this section because the need for the attachment
procedure has been eliminated by the prior section. This section also
clearly indicates that attachment of a foreign state's assets by state
courts would be prohibited by federal law. Consequently, the states
would be required to adopt procedures conforming to those specified
in section 1608. Immunity from execution of a judgment, however, is
subject to certain exceptions set out in section 1610.
Section 1610 marks a reversal in United States practica and a
fulfillment of the promise of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity."' This section distinguishes between execution of a
judgment" 2 on the assets of a foreign state or political subdivision
and execution on the assets of an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state or subdivision. To the extent that the assets of a foreign
state or political subdivision are used for a particular commercial
activity in the United States, such assets will not be immune if the
execution relates to a claim based either on that commercial activity
or on rights in property taken in violation of international law and
present in the United States in connection with that activity." 3 Thus
not all assets of a foreign state found in the United States may be
levied on to satisfy a judgment against the foreign state; the assets
must be specifically related to the claim. This section treats each
state-controlled enterprise as a separate entity and prohibits, for
example, the execution on the assets of a state-owned airline to satisfy
a judgment against a state-trading corporation. The reason for this
limitation is apparent. The state qua state is not sued under the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity; foreign state liability arises
only as a result of its connection with a particular commercial activity.
All the commercial assets of a foreign state, therefore, should not be
available for satisfaction of a judgment when only a particular activity
is found liable. The proposed statute further provides, however, that

111. The precise language of the statute is that a foreign state's assets "shall
not be immune from attachment for purposes of execution or from execution of a
judgment rendered against that foreign state.... ." Attachment for purposes of
"execution" is somewhat confusing, but the drafters use this language to cover all
bases. In some states an attachment execution is the term given to a process of
garnishment for the satisfaction of a judgment. See Griffin, Execution Against the
Foreign Sovereign's Property: The Current Scene, 1961 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. 105.
112. See notes 60-67 supra and accompanying text.
113. The objection to a provision permitting execution on property "taken in
violation of international law" is the same as that raised in connection with
allowing jurisdiction over such property. See notes 89-92 supra and accompanying
text.
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this limitation may be waived, explicitly or implicitly, by the foreign
state and may not be withdrawn after a claim arises. If a levy is to be
made on public property or a public debt of the foreign state, the
waiver must be explicit." 4
The bill imposes no such limitations on the execution of a judgment
on the assets of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state or of a
subdivision of a foreign state. In the event an agency or instrumentality is found subject to the jurisdiction of a court under section
1605, the court will have jurisdiction to order an execution on any
assets of the agency or instrumentality found in the United States.
The fact that the claim arises out of the activity of a particular
segment of the agency or instrumentality will not serve to limit
execution to the assets of that segment. The assets of another agency
or instrumentality, however, may not be levied on to satisfy a
judgment. Thus this section treats agencies or instrumentalities as
separate "corporate" entities analogous to American corporations.
The drafters expressed the fear that if all the assets of the commercial
activities of a foreign state's agencies or instrumentalities were
combined for purposes of satisfying a judgment, United States
corporations operating abroad might be subjected to similar treatment. The foreign state, agency, or instrumentalities may waive this
limitation under section 1610(b) (2).
The final section of the proposed legislation is section 1611, which
specifies that notwithstanding section 1610 certain types of assets will
remain immune from execution on a judgment. These immune assets
are: (1) those of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for
its own account; and (2) those assets that are, or are intended to be,
used in connection with a military activity if such assets are of a
military character or are under the control of a military authority or
defense agency. The immunity extended to a foreign central bank or
monetary authority has, of course, no connection with the assets of a
foreign state that are held in United States or foreign controlled banks
in connection with the commercial activity of the foreign state,
subdivision, agency or instrumentality. These types of bank accounts
will remain subject to execution under the provisions of section 1610.
Central banks, on the other hand, exist for the purpose of exchanging
currencies in connection with the trading activities of the foreign
state. 1 ' If these assets were to become available for executions on
114. While this requirement is not provided for in the statute, an explicit
waiver in such cases conforms to the policy of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity and § 1606(a)(1) of the proposed statute.
115. See Ames, State Operations in Gold and Foreign Exchange, 24 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 329 (1959).
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judgments rendered against the foreign states, as in the case of a
foreign state's general waiver under section 1610, the foreign state
would probably refuse to deposit funds in the United States.
Permitting executions on central banks, therefore, could aggravate our
balance of payments condition.
The reason for granting immunity to assets of a military character
fulfilling the requirements established in section 1611(2)(a) and (b) is
threefold. First, these types of assets are of a public character and
have been traditionally immune from attachment or execution in
satisfaction of a judgment under international law. Secondly, military
assets of a foreign state are generally found in this country only in
connection with a purchase of such assets by the foreign state. If
execution on these assets were permitted it could cause embarrassment to the United States 16 and might force foreign states to seek
other sources for the purchase of military hardware. The overall effect
in that case would be a deterioration of our balance of trade posture.
Finally, execution on the military assets of foreign states in this
country might invite reciprocal treatment by foreign states in which
the United States has significant concentrations of troops and
facilities." 1 Considering the magnitude of the deployment of United
States forces abroad, it becomes obvious that the United States could
lose much more than would be gained by allowing executions on
foreign states' military assets.
IV.

APRAGMATIC CONSIDERATION OF THE OPTIONS

AVAILABLE TO CONGRESS

This Part postulates three alternatives presented to Congress by the
proposed legislation and considers the ramifications of each. First,
Congress may forego the opportunity to venture into this area of
foreign relations and refuse to enact the bill. Secondly, Congress may
pass the bill as drafted, thereby proscribing the future use of State
Department suggestions. Thirdly, Congress could pass the bill, but
amend it to include a "Hickenlooper loophole" in order to enable the
executive to suggest immunity to the courts in cases where adjudication might adversely affect a vital national interest.
A.

Option No. 1: Refusal to Enact the Bill

To date, Congress has played a minor role in the formulation of a
national policy on sovereign immunity. Despite constitutional
authority to prescribe the jurisdiction of the lower federal
116. Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 2, at 156.
117. Id.
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courts11 s and the insult of "executive legislation" by State Department pronouncement in the Tate letter, Congress has shown little
interest in resolving the present problems of foreign state immunity. In
fact, there is no evidence that Congress has ever initiated a study on
the subject. 119 Consequently, it is not unduly pessimistic to suggest
that the present proposal might not generate enough interest to be
enacted into law.
In the event that Congress fails to enact the proposed legislation,
the executive and judicial branches must continue the process of
examining and defining their respective roles in this narrow area of
international relations. As previously discussed, the courts now defer
to State Department suggestions of immunity, regardless whether the
claimant's suit is based on a commercial activity carried on in the
It may be perilous, however,
United States by the foreign states.'
to rely on the past for guidance in future immunity cases. Not since
1926, in the Pesaro case, 2 ' has the Supreme Court considered the
substantive issues of sovereign immunity. Moreover, the last case in
which the weight and effect of a State Department suggestion of
immunity was considered by the Supreme Court was decided over
30 years ago.' 2 2 That the Court's attitude might have changed
regarding the conclusive and binding effect of executive suggestions in
foreign affairs cases is indicated in two recent cases involving the act
of state doctrine. Before discussing these cases, it is important to
nature of the sovereign immunity and act of
establish the correlative
23
state doctrines.1
Both doctrines are judicially created principles of "self-restraint"
arising out of the courts' recognition that disputes involving foreign
sovereigns are "political questions' 24 best resolved by the political

118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 and art. III, § 2. For a discussion on Congress'
power to define the jurisdiction of the federal district courts see Note, supra note
3, at 408-10.
119. T. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
320-21 (1970).
120. See notes 10-40 supra and accompanying text.
121. Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). The lower
courts, however, have consistently deferred to executive suggestion. See note 4
supra.
122. Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
123. For a penetrative analysis of the development and correlation of these
two doctrines see Maier, supra note 90.
124. The political question doctrine was exhaustively studied by the Supreme
Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), a case involving domestic issues
relating to a state's apportionment plan. The Court discussed, in dictum, the
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branches of government. The courts assume that their intrusion into
the foreign affairs area when the acts of a foreign sovereign are at issue
might have a disruptive effect on the peace of nations and could
embarrass the executive in his conduct of foreign affairs. 12 5 Thus, as
far as private plaintiffs are concerned, both doctrines operate to deny
them their day in court for the sake of foreign policy. 12 6 More
important than the case of the hour, then, is the judicial realization
that foreign policy is to be promulgated by the political branches, not
by the courts. Nonetheless, the doctrines are not predicated on
executive mandate; the courts have the power to adjudicate, but an
acute awareness of the constitutional necessity of the separation of
powers doctrine restrains them from exercising their jurisdiction.
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,12 7 the Supreme Court
invoked the act of state doctrine to preclude adjudication on the
merits of a case arising out of the confiscation of American-owned
assets in Cuba by the Castro government. Although the case did not
involve either the sovereign immunity doctrine or an executive
suggestion, the Court's reasoning is educative in the context of a
discussion of judicial abstention in cases involving foreign affairs,
political questions and the separation of powers doctrine. The Court
examined the role of the executive vis-d-vis the courts and clearly
stated that the decision to abstain was based solely on the Court's
understanding of the proper role of the judiciary in foreign affairs

application of the political question doctrine to cases in the foreign affairs sphere:
"Yet it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 369 U.S. at 211. The Court concluded
that factors such as the question posed, the history of this problem's management
by the political branches, the ability of the judiciary to handle the case and the
possible consequences of an adjudication could be as important as the need for
the nation to speak with one voice. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 210-16 (1972).
125. Compare Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918), with Ex
parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943), and Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A.,
295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
126. "[The political question doctrine] operates, and is intended to operate,
to deny a plaintiff or defendant his day in court, or at least, to refuse a judicial
application of private law to the settlement of his dispute.... Implicit in the
doctrine's application is the recognition that justice for these parties is a
consideration secondary to the long-term political interests of the nation as a
whole, the advancement of which is entrusted to the President in international
relations." Cheatham & Maer, Private International Law and Its Sources, 22
VAND. L. REV. 27,80 (1968).
127. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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cases. Finding that the act of state doctrine was not compelled by
either international law or the Constitution, the Court explained:
The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitutional" underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of
government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the
competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular
kinds of decisions in the area of international relations. The doctrine as
formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial
Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals
both for itself and1 for the community of nations as a whole in the
international sphere. 2
While this excerpt from the Sabbatino opinion might suggest judicial
deference to executive primacy in foreign relations, the Court
dispelled any notion that an executive communication could control
the Court's disposition of the case:
It is suggested that if the act of state doctrine is applicable to violations of
international law, it should only be so when the Executive Branch expressly
stipulates that it does not wish the courts to pass on the question of
validity.... It is highly questionable whether the examination of validity by
the judiciary should depend on an educated guess by the Executive as to
[sic] probable results and, at any rate, should a prediction be wrong,
the
129
Executive might be embarrassed in its dealings with other countries.
It is clear that the Sabbatino Court did not attempt to circumscribe
the executive's role in foreign affairs. It is also evident, however, that
the executive cannot control the judicial process simply because 130
the
controversy extends beyond the boundaries of the United States.
The most recent Supreme Court case to deal with the act of state
doctrine is FirstNational City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba. 13 1 In
this case the Cuban bank, an instrumentality of the Cuban government, sued to recover the excess realized by defendant in a sale of

128. 376 U.S. at 423.
129. 376 U.S. at 436.
130. "The voices of the judges, when they pass over the water's edge, must
harmonize with the executive's. The exercise of judicial deference is then
recognition of the executive's prerogatives, not abdication of the judiciary's
responsibility." Cardozo, supra note 35, at 498. For an analysis of all of the
federal court opinions in the Sabbatino case see LILLICH, supra note 33, at
45-113.
131. 406 U.S. 759 (1972), noted in 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 272
(1972).
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collateral that had secured a loan of the Cuban government.
Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that it should be allowed to retain
the excess as a partial set-off for losses incurred when the Castro
government confiscated defendant's property located in Cuba. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had held that the act of state
doctrine barred adjudication on the merits of the counterclaim,
notwithstanding a State Department suggestion during the litigation
that the act of state doctrine need not be applied in this or similar
cases involving the government of Cuba."3 2 The Supreme Court
reversed in a five-to-four decision, in which four separate opinions
were written. For purposes of this discussion, the significance of the
specific holding in the case is of secondary importance to the attitudes
of the Justices expressed in their divisive opinions.
Writing for the court, Mr. Justice Rehnquist13 3 sought a basis for
accepting the State Department's suggestion as dispositive of the issue,
which he apparently found in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,
the progenitor of the sovereign immunity doctrine in the United
Justice Rehnquist determined that since the executive
States. "
branch hadunequivocally determined that it would not be embarrassed
by adjudication on the merits, the reasons for applying the act of
state doctrine were no longer present in the controversy before the
132. Letter from John R. Stevenson to the clerk of the United States
Supreme Court, the Honorable E. Robert Seaver, Nov. 17, 1970, in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 442 F.2d 530, 536-38 (1971). The
letter stated, in pertinent part: "Recent events, in our view, make appropriate a
determination by the Department of State that the act of state doctrine need not
be applied when it is raised to bar adjudication of a counterclaim or setoff when
(a) the foreign state's claim arises from a relationship between the parties existing
when the act of state occurred; (b) the amount of the relief to be granted is
limited to the amount of the foreign state's claim; and (c) the foreign policy
interests of the United States do not require application of the doctrine....
The Department of State believes that the act of state doctrine should not be
applied to bar consideration of a defendant's counterclaim or set-off against the
Government of Cuba in this or like cases."
133. Note that the case was decided by plurality, not majority, opinion. Mr.
Justice Rehnquist was joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice White.
134. "The separate lines of cases enunciating both the act of state and
sovereign immunity doctrines have a common source in the case of The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch 116, 146 (1812) [11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116]....
[T] he policy considerations at the root of this fundamental principle [sovereign
immunity] are in large part also the underpinnings of the act of state doctrine."
406 U.S. at 762.
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Court. 3 ' For Justice Rehnquist, then, the act of state doctrine is to
be treated in the same manner as the sovereign immunity doctrine: an
executive suggestion will control in either context. Mr. Justice Douglas
concurred in the result, but not in the reasoning of Justice Rehnquist.
Disagreeing with the controlling effect given the State Department's
letter, 3 6 Justice Douglas based his concurring opinion on the "fair
dealing" principle of National City Bank v. Republic of China.'3 7 Mr.
Justice Powell also concurred in the result, but reached his decision by
still another route. He also disagreed with the conclusive effect given
the State Department's letter, but found Republic of China inappropriate in an act of state case. Justice Powell concluded that the
Sabbatino Court improperly applied the principles underlying the act
of state doctrine and that unless an "exercise of jurisdiction would
interfere with delicate foreign relations conducted by the political
branches"' 3 8 the Court should hear the case. Since there was
obviously no interference present in this case, Justice Powell found
that the Court's duty to adjudicate was compelled by international
law, not by executive suggestion.' 3 9
Mr. Justice Brennan dissented 140 on the ground that the act of
state doctrine was compelled in the present case by the Court's
holding in Sabbatino. Since the Executive maintained that Cuba had
violated international law by confiscating American-owned property,
Justice Brennan reasoned that the Court had little choice but to
rubber-stamp the executive's position; to do otherwise might grievously prejudice the executive's conduct of foreign affairs. Consequently,

135. Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated that "[o]ur holding is in no sense an
abdication of the judicial function to the Executive Branch." 406 U.S. at 768. A
reading of his opinion compels the opposite conclusion. The act of state doctrine
is based on the "constitutional" underpinnings of the doctrine of separation of
powers, not deference to the executive's primacy in international affairs.
136. "Otherwise, the Court becomes a mere errand boy for the Executive
Branch which may choose to pick some people's chestnuts from the fire, but not
others'." 406 U.S. at 773 (footnote omitted).
137. 348 U.S. 356 (1955). See notes 44 & 45 supra and accompanying text.
138. 406 U.S. at 775-76.
139. Mr. Justice Powell espoused the views persistently urged by Professor
Richard A. Falk. According to Falk, domestic courts have an affirmative duty to
apply international law where a consensus exists among the community of
nations. "The judicial arena is an appropriate place for an articulation of a general
view of international relations in which doctrines of reciprocal deference govern
areas of significant diversity and in which common efforts at enforcement govern
areas of significant consensus." R. FALK, supra note 35, at 173.
140. Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Marshall joined in the dissent.
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Justice Brennan concluded that the Court could not function as an
impartial tribunal under the present circumstances and, therefore, the
act of state doctrine was required to preserve the dignity and
credibility of both the judicial and political branches of government.
To the extent that the present attitude of the Supreme Court
regarding its role in sovereign immunity cases can be extrapolated
from Sabbatino and First National City Bank, it appears that the
conclusive effect now given State Department suggestions will be
re-examined in future immunity cases. 14 1 Ironically, a reversal of Ex
parte Republic of Peru and an assertion of judicial competence to
decide foreign state immunity cases would not be antagonistic to the
executive branch. It is, after all, the executive branch that is seeking to
remove itself from the decision-making process in immunity cases.
Thus a congressional refusal to enact the proposed statute might well
usher in an era of "judicial legislation" in cases involving foreign state
defendants. 1 42 Indeed, it is arguable that judicial legislation is
preferable to a federal statute on foreign state immunity. The State
Department would be relieved of its obligation to entertain foreign
state requests for immunity, but would retain the ability to suggest
immunity in particular cases in which it would opine that national
interests dictate the recognition of immunity. 4 3
B.

Option No. 2: Enactment of the Bill in
its PresentForm

The proposed statute is founded on the demonstrated need to
regulate suits against foreign state-owned commercial activities doing
business in the United States. Because Congress has the power to
define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts 144 and the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,' 14 it cannot be
141. See L. HENKIN, supra note 124, at 63.
142. Id. at 216-24. Henkin suggests that the reasoning and dicta of Sabbatino
"establishes foreign affairs as a domain in which federal courts can make law with
supremacy."
143. The Court has never implied that an executive suggestion would be
completely inconsequential in a case involving foreign affairs matters. In future
cases a suggestion would doubtlessly be weighted by the courts, but not given the
conclusive and binding effect now permitted.
144. See note 118 supra.
145. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. Other provisions of the Constitution could
also be employed to support the constitutionality of enacting the proposed
statute. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("necessary and proper" clause);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("general Welfare" clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 11 ("War powers" clause); see Note, supra note 3, at 411-13.
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seriously doubted that the statute would be a constitutional exercise
of legislative power. Authority for the constitutionality of the
proposed statute is found by reference, once again, to the closely
related act of state doctrine.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in the Sabbatino
case, 146 an indignant and irate Congress passed the Hickenlooper
amendment,' 4 7 which reversed the presumption in act of state cases.
This legislation stipulated that the courts could no longer invoke the
act of state doctrine to bar adjudication in cases in which Americanowned property had been confiscated in violation of international law.
The amendment provided, however, that the President had the power
to suggest that the act of state doctrine be applied when he deemed it
necessary to the interests of foreign policy. 148 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit upheld the Hickenlooper amendment in the
face of constitutional challenges based on legislative interference with
the executive and the judiciary in the case of Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Farr.14 9 The Farr court found ample authority for Congress's
enactment of the statute in the commerce clause of the Constitu50
tion.1
While the Farrcase appears dispositive of the question of authority
to enact the proposed sovereign immunity statute, it is doubtful
whether that case would support the constitutionality of the
application of the proposed statute to future immunity cases. Unlike
the Hickenlooper amendment, the proposed statute has no provision
for executive suggestions.'-' The proposed statute could portend a
constitutional crisis if, for example, a case similar to Rich v. Naviera

146. See notes 127-31 supra and accompanying text.
147. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970). The Hickenlooper Amendment, also
known as the Sabbatino Amendment, was attached to the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1964.
148. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970). The proviso permitting executive
intervention states that the statute is not applicable "in any case with respect to
which the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is
required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States
and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court."
149. 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
150. 383 F.2d at 182-83.
151. The proposed statute does not explicitly prohibit the use of executive
suggestion of immunity and it is at least arguable that the executive could file one
with the court, if circumstances dictate the need to do so. The drafters of the bill,
however, have made it quite clear that the purpose of the statute is to preclude
the use of suggestion. See Letter of Transmittal to the President of the Senate,
supra note 2, at 119-20; Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 2, at 133.
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Vacuba15 2 were to arise after the statute's enactment and the
President communicated a suggestion of immunity to the court. A
crisis might also arise if a court issued a writ of execution on certain
foreign state-owned commercial property and the foreign state
informed the President that if the property were sold at an execution
sale all United States military facilities must be removed from that
country immediately. Would not the executive have a constitutional
duty"5 3 to communicate this information to the courts and demand
that the court grant immunity from execution? If the court refused to
defer to the executive's demand for immunity on the grounds that the
statute absolutely precludes executive decision-making in sovereign
immunity cases, the result would be of far greater consequence than
mere embarrassment to the executive. Conversely, if the court
determined that it must sustain the executive's power over foreign
state immunity cases, the power of Congress would be vitiated and the
court would have become a political arm of the executive branch.
It seems unnecessary to subject the courts to this dilemma.
Although the Constitution defines certain powers that are within the
exclusive domain of each of the three branches of the national
government,15 4 the document is not all-encompassing. Many foreign
affairs powers are concurrently exercised by both political branches,
with the result that there exists a "zone of twilight" in which
authority can be found for either branch to exert its power.'
In

152. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
153. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2: "The President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States .. ... The President would be sorely
remiss in his duties as Commander in Chief if he permitted, without objection,
action by a domestic court which could seriously prejudice the safety of the
United States or its allies. See Cardozo, supra note 35, at 462.
154. See L. HENKIN, supra note 124, at 89-104; Cheatham & Maier, supra
note 126, at 43-94.
155. The often cited concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952), is instructive in this
regard: "When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or

denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there
is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or
in which its distribution is uncertain.... ." 343 U.S. at 637. This statement
summarizes the present state of the law in sovereign immunity cases. Compare
Justice Jackson's conclusions with the proposed statute in the event it were passed
without change: "When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he

can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential
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cases involving sovereign immunity, the courts have recognized that
the decisions of the political branches should control." 6 Over the
years Congress has acquiesced to the primacy of the executive branch
in this field and judicial decision has established the validity of this
executive power.' 5 7 The fundamental question before Congress,

therefore, is whether it should enact legislation stripping the executive
of all power in an area in which "any actual test of power is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
rather than on abstract theories of law."' 5 8 An exegesis of the
Constitution, the holdings and dicta of federal court cases, and
treatises by leading scholars is not attempted because the question
propounded is not susceptible to precise resolution. 5 9 There is ample
authority for the proposition that the executive has plenary powers
over the conduct of foreign affairs as well as for the assertion that
congressional legislation proscribes executive action.1 60 Because this
proposed statute intrudes on an area of conflicting and concurrent
powers of the political branches of government, it is suggested that

control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the
subject. ... " 343 U.S. at 637-38. (In Youngstown, the President was precluded
from seizing steel mills during a time of national crisis because the Congress had
specifically denied him such power.)
156. See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). See cases
cited note 34 supra.
157. "The effects of the 'creative tension' between the political and judicial
departments of government, resulting in preeminence of the executive as a private
lawmaker, is nowhere more effectively illustrated than in the line of cases
concerning the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Cheatham & Maier, supra note
126, at 83-84. See 15 CATH. U.L. REV. 234-35 (1966).
158. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
159. "Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had
they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as
enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A
century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result
but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each side
of any question. They largely cancel each other." 343 U.S. at 634-35. See Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962).
160. For a compilation of cases and authorities supporting either side of the
"powers" question see E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 1787-1957 (4th ed. 1957);
L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972); Berger,
The PresidentialMonopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MicH. L. REV. 1 (1972);
Cheatham & Maier, PrivateInternationalLaw and Its Sources, 22 VAND. L. REV.
27 (1968).
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Congress approach this crucial question by examining the practicalities
and possible consequences
of silencing the executive voice in sovereign
16 1
immunity cases.
C. Option No. 3: Enactment of the Bill with an
Amendment PermittingExecutive Suggestion
Having demonstrated that the consequences of enacting the
proposed statute could have extremely deleterious effects on the
delicate interplay between the branches of the federal government and
on the conduct of foreign affairs by the executive, consideration now
is given to an amendment that would allow the executive to retain a
role in future sovereign immunity cases. Specifically, the question is
whether a proviso, similar to the Hickenlooper amendment, 162 should
be added to the proposed statute. As previously discussed, the
Hickenlooper amendment was a congressional response to judicial
foreign policy-making under the act of state doctrine.1 63 Congress
reversed the presumption under that doctrine and compelled the
courts of the United States to adjudicate cases involving the
confiscation of American-owned assets by foreign states, unless:
"[T]he President determines that application of the act of state
doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy
interests of the United States ... ,164
The inclusion of a "Hickenlooper loophole" in the proposed
foreign state immunity statute has considerable appeal. First, no
compelling reason exists for completely silencing the executive branch
in sovereign immunity cases. These cases arise in the "twilight zone"
of concurrent powers wherein neither political branch has been
constitutionally designated as the sole or exclusive actor. Moreover,
the executive possesses far more competence in the area of foreign
affairs. The executive branch has at its disposal the nation's
intelligence-gathering services and only the executive is in a position to respond quickly and effectively to changing circumstances.1 65 Neither Congress nor the courts have access to such
161. "[I] nternationally the consequences of a rejection of executive suggestions ...can be grave in a world where friendly relations often rest on very thin
ice." Cardozo, supra note 35, at 461.
162. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970).
163. See notes 146-50 supra and accompanying text.
164. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970).
165. See Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948); Cheatham & Maier, supra note 126, at 69-70; Fullbright, American
Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an 18th-Century Constitution, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 1, 2-5 (1961).
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information; moreover, they cannot communicate or negotiate with
foreign sovereigns. Thus executive branch expertise would be more
beneficial to the nation than an intractable domestic law that stifles
the executive's voice. Cooperation rather than conflict is required for
an effective national policy on foreign state immunity.
Secondly, amending the proposed statute would permit executive
suggestions in cases in which judicial determinations might have
adverse consequences on the nation's foreign relations policy, without
the possibility of constitutional confrontation. The statute could be
applied routinely in a majority of cases without executive intervention. The statute contains adequate guidelines for judicial decision,
and foreign states would be put on notice that the State Department
could no longer process requests for immunity. Executive intervention
in the judicial process would occur -solely because the executive
branch had determined, either through its intelligence network or by
diplomatic note from a foreign state, that adjudication or execution
could prejudice national interests.
Thirdly, a Hickenlooper-type proviso offers important advantages
over other forms of executive communication with the courts. For
example, a State Department amicus brief presumably would not be
precluded under the proposed statute. The utilization of an amicus
brief to inform the courts of possible adverse consequences of an
adjudication or of a judgment against the foreign state, however, could
put an enormous burden on the court. The court might feel
constrained to accord the amicus brief undue weight in arriving at its
decision in order to avoid embarrassing the executive or to avert an
international crisis. This sort of communication, therefore, could
compromise the court's judicial function. Furthermore, a policy
position urged in an amicus brief might become disguised in the
court's opinion, which would then serve as precedent in future cases.
An executive suggestion under a Hickenlooper-type proposal, however, would apply only in a particular case and would have no
precedential value.
If a provision permitting executive suggestion is included in the
statute, the executive obviously could retain its dominant role in
deciding when foreign states should be granted immunity. After
announcing in the Tate letter that the courts should decide future
immunity cases in accordance with the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, the State Department filed suggestions of immunity in four
cases.' 6 6 Nevertheless, the executive branch seems determined to

166. See cases cited note 34 supra.
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divorce itself from the sovereign immunity decision making process.
Within the past four years, the State Department has drafted two
statutes that provide guidelines for judicial decision making and
preclude executive intervention in the judicial process.' 67 Apparently, the State Department has come to realize that it is the
"wrong organ to be deciding questions of immunity. 1 6 8 Moreover,
pressures on the Department to suggest immunity under the present
system have produced anomalous results. The tendency has been to
grant immunity to unfriendly nations instead of to our trading
partners. 169 This practice does not go unobserved by friendly
countries, which undoubtedly demand more favorable State Department treatment when they are called before a domestic court.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the proposed statute should be
amended to allow executive suggestions because the executive has a
definite need to remain flexible in his conduct of foreign affairs."7' A
future President might well need all possible foreign affairs powers in
order to avoid a foreign relations catastrophe."'
V.

CONCLUSION

A formalized national policy on the foreign state immunity issue is
clearly preferable to the current variegated state of the law and is
essential to a viable foreign trade program. Moreover, the United
States has the responsibility to both its own citizens and foreign
state-owned commercial enterprises for providing a sound legal
structure that will govern their transactions. Nonetheless, the crucial

167. Reference is made here to the Belman-Lowenfeld statutory proposal,
which was never submitted to Congress. See Note, supra note 3, at 432-33.
168. Belman, supra note 3, at 183. "[T]he Department does not have
adequate staff or adequate legal authority to cope with the task of sorting out all
the complicated issues of law and fact which bear upon a sovereign immunity
determination." Leigh, supra note 33, at 191. See Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at
913.
169. 60 MIcH. L. REV. 1142, 1144 (1962).
170. "The political issues cannot be divorced from the legal considerations.
Thus, if the State Department promoted a Hickenlooper Amendment without
loopholes, or otherwise tied its own hands, then the political repercussions could
be disastrous." Cardozo, Comments, 1969 PRoc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 193-94.
See generally Franck, The Courts, the State Department and National Policy: A
Criterionfor JudicialAbdication, 44 MINN. L. REV. 1101 (1960).
171. "If cases such as Rich v. Naviera Vacuba are to be characterized as 'legal
monstrosities,' consider what a 'political monstrosity' the failure to grant
immunity could have occasioned in such a case." Cardozo, supra note 170, at 194.
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question presented by this draft legislation is not whether an
unequivocal national policy is desirable, but whether Congress should
create that policy by enacting legislation that would remove the
executive from any role in foreign state immunity cases.
Given the inherent struggles in a constitutional government of
exclusive and shared powers, perhaps the wiser course for Congress
would be to leave the twilight zone intact, thus permitting a solution
to gradually evolve through judicial decisions. But this is a slow and
tedious process and the government needs a more immediate solution.
A more expedient and agreeable alternative might be for the State
Department to pursue amendments to Title 28 of the United States
Code and to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure so that jurisdiction
and service of process on foreign state defendants will be statutorily
defined. The remainder of the proposed statute could then be
promulgated as national policy in a document similar to the Tate
letter. Except for the new position on the execution of judgments, the
present state of the law would remain basically unchanged. Whatever
the decision of Congress on the proposed statute, it is hoped that the
practical realities of the requirements of the United States qua
political entity in the community of sovereign national states will not
be obscured by the complaisant surrender of foreign affairs power by
the executive branch.
R. Lee Bennett
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